



History

U.S. Army Quartermaster School

Officer Candidate Brigade

Fort Lee, Virginia

April 1966 - February 1968



HISTORY

U. S. ARMY QUARTERMASTER SCHOOL

OFFICER CANDIDATE BRIGADE

FORT LEE, VIRGINIA

APRIL 1966 - FEBRUARY 1968

Assembled by:

Ron Demery
(member of Class 66-16)

3102 E. Matthews Dr.
Joplin, MO, 64801-8224
(417) 317-2670
ronddem@yahoo.com

2011

(Class Graduation Photos Last Updated: February 25, 2020)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface		iii
Chapter I	Introduction	1
Chapter II	Planning and Organization	2
Chapter III	Academic Instruction	4
Chapter IV	Leadership Training	9
Chapter V	Evaluation	14
Chapter VI	The Candidate	18
Appendix I	Class Statistics	20
Appendix II	Class Span Chart	21
Appendix III	Class Rosters	22
Appendix IV	Class Photos	46
Appendix V	Officer Candidate Brigade Cadre	53
Graduate Index	Alphabetical list of all Quartermaster OCS graduates	57
QM OCS Graduate Vietnam Casualties		68

PREFACE

This is a reproduction and expansion of the "History, US Army Quartermaster School, OC Brigade, April 1966 - February 1968." An original copy from 1968 was in the possession of Larry Bayer, former Commanding Officer of Company A, OCS Brigade (March 1966 - September 1966) and an original copy resides at the Quartermaster Museum, Fort Lee, Virginia. The "History" has been completely retyped and obvious errors of typing and grammar have been corrected. An addendum (Course of Instruction) has been added to Chapter III (Academic Instruction).

Appendix I, a chart which lists a summary of facts about the 22 OCS classes, has been added.

Appendix II, a chart which shows the time spans of the 22 classes, has been added.

Appendix III replaces Appendix I in the original. In the original, it only reflected class summaries, but in this version has been expanded to include class graduate rosters. Sources for the class graduate rosters include: newspaper articles about classes, Senior Review pamphlets, official Graduation Booklets, a class-made list with mailing addresses/first assignments, Army Special Orders, and graduation photos with captions giving the names of those in the photos. Several classes' graduating numbers conflict from source to source. In addition to simple omissions, members may have been missing when class photos were taken. Care has been taken to include all names that are believed to be graduates.

Appendix IV, containing available class photos, has been added.

Appendix V replaces Appendix II in the original History. It is a roster of the Officer Candidate Brigade cadre officers.

Thanks go to contributors of information sources for this project. They are:

<i>Dr. Steve Anders, CASCOM Historian, Fort Lee</i>	<i>William J. Griewe, Class 67-8</i>
<i>LTC (ret) Larry W. Bayer, CO, Co. A (3/66-9/66)</i>	<i>Gary C. Groneweg, Class 66-26</i>
<i>Alan L. Bergman, Class 68-1</i>	<i>Jim A. Hoene, Class 67-5</i>
<i>Doug S. J. Burmester, Ft Knox OCS Historian</i>	<i>Donald A. Isensee, Class 67-4</i>
<i>Henry B. Cantrell, Class 67-12</i>	<i>Ray A. Jurczak, Class 67-10</i>
<i>MAJ (ret) John Cather, Class 66-16</i>	<i>Kenneth R. Kolacki, Class 67-11</i>
<i>Wayne A. Cathey, Class 67-17</i>	<i>Ronald V. Krakowski, Class 68-3</i>
<i>COL (ret) Carey E. Cole, Class 67-13</i>	<i>John F. Logan, Class 67-13</i>
<i>James W. Coultas, Class 67-10</i>	<i>MAJ (ret) Arthur L. Murdaugh, Class 66-21</i>
<i>COL (ret) Larry V. Cramer, CO, Co. E</i>	<i>Peter P. Salomone, Class 67-10</i>
<i>(7/67-8/67) & Co. D (8/67-2/68)</i>	
<i>LTC (ret) Michael D. Crawford, Class 67-15</i>	<i>Joseph L. Sprow, Class 68-3</i>
<i>David E. Furer, Class 67-16</i>	<i>LTC (ret) Klyle N. Stall, Jr., Class 66-21</i>
<i>Val F. Ganter, Class 67-1</i>	<i>Henry A. Turlington, Class 67-15</i>
<i>David J. Gloeckler, Jr., Class 67-3</i>	<i>Mark E. Weber, Class 67-17</i>
<i>William T. Grafe, Class 67-6</i>	<i>Thomas C. Willers, Class 67-9</i>

Due to my declining health, in January 2014, I turned all my files on this project over to John F. Logan to maintain and provide future updates. He has built and maintains a website for his F Troop Class 67-13 fellow classmates. You can view its opening page at www.ftroophome.com. His email address is webmaster@ftroophome.com.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When the World War II Quartermaster Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Camp Lee closed its doors in 1946, its faculty could look back on five years of academic operations that in large part were responsible for training officers for the Quartermaster Corps. After an absence of 20 years, officer candidate training returned to the Quartermaster School at Fort Lee. This reactivation was necessitated by President Johnson's plans for a 235,000 man increase in the active Army and the consequent expansion of existing training facilities and the opening of new ones.

The increased need for trained Army officers could not be met by the output of the current sources. Two measures were taken to meet the increased demands. Selected officers in key positions, who were due to leave the service, were retained; and six new officer candidate schools were established to furnish some twelve thousand second lieutenants during fiscal year 1966. These additional officer candidate schools were to continue in operation as long as necessary to meet the additional requirements for Army officers. The new schools were to be established at Fort Gordon, Georgia (Signal Corps); Fort Belvoir, Virginia (Corps of Engineers); Fort Knox, Kentucky (Armor); Fort Eustis, Virginia (Transportation); Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland (Ordnance); and Fort Lee, Virginia (Quartermaster).

The first class arrived at Fort Lee on 15 May 1966 with a complement of 93 candidates who had just completed 13 weeks of officer-oriented, branch-immaterial training at Fort Knox, Kentucky.



This, in itself, sounds simple enough; a fairly elementary beginning for a training organization designed to mold novice soldiers into well-disciplined military leaders by nourishing them with knowledge in command, staff, weapons, tactics, supply, finance, accounting, services, and management; developing them as whole men with vigorous physical training, constant surveillance, and unrelenting discipline; and patterning their standards of performance after that of commissioned officers. The purpose of it all was to produce Quartermaster second lieutenants capable of performing duties in Quartermaster-type assignments commensurate with their grade.

If all this does sound effortless, it's because, like all well thought out coordinated efforts, the smoothness of execution is often construed to indicate a similar ease in planning. Establishing an officer candidate program at Fort Lee was no easy task. Many hours of planning were expended to launch this program, and many more hours were consumed refining the crude machinery into an operational facility. This chronicle serves as a description of the what, why, and how of the OCS program at Fort Lee, and the changes instrumented to purify an operation and cultivate a product.

CHAPTER II

PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION

The formal, on target planning started 2 September 1965 when the School was directed to submit a schedule of classes for a "9-Week, Phase II OCS". This meant that future Quartermaster officers would receive their first 13 weeks (Phase I) at the Fort Knox School and then come to Fort Lee for the remainder (Phase II), of the officer candidate course.

Late in October 1965, a seminar was held at Fort Knox, Kentucky, to coordinate with the schools involved in the two-phased program and to assist in the preparation of Programs of Instruction. Six members from the Quartermaster School Staff and Faculty attended the sessions. The first order of business was formulating a Program of Instruction (POI) for the officer candidate course. This project necessitated the taking of a Program of Instruction for the Army Supply Officer Course and converting it into a 9-week Phase II program for the School's officer candidates. The program was finished late in October, printed in November and sent to CONARC (Continental Army Command) in the latter month.

While this was going on, CONARC was grinding out guidance for the Officer Candidate Schools. For example, the Schools were advised to assume a 30 percent attrition of candidates; 25 percent in Phase I and 5 percent in Phase II. An output of 166 officers was expected from the Quartermaster OCS not later than 30 June 1966. Tentative input for fiscal year 1967 would be 167. Late in the year FY 66 input figures climbed to 400 for Phase I, 300 for Phase II.

In late 1965, it was contemplated that the Signal and Engineer Corps would have single phase officer candidate schools in addition to Infantry, Artillery, and Armor. All other branches, including Quartermaster, would provide Phase II training for candidates after they had received Phase I elsewhere. All this was abruptly changed when CONARC directed the Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Transportation Schools to initiate planning for their own single phase, 23-week OCS's to commence operations around 1 July 1966.

With the latest directive from CONARC, new plans had to be initiated. In the meantime, CONARC approved the Phase II program of instruction for a mere three classes that would enter this program in the Quartermaster School.

Planning for a 23-week program entailed more detailed problems than the 9-week venture. The same planners who put together the initial Phase II program were assembled again to meet this formidable task. Now, a formal 23-week program had to be devised with the necessary implementations to maintain it. Personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and organizations had to be brought together to form an effective training organization which could operate as an entity. School representatives were dispatched to Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and Fort Knox, Kentucky, to observe single phase OCS's in operation. Other personnel coordinated with the Quartermaster Center and Fort Lee staff to set up barracks, classrooms, training areas, and the other facilities needed.

A Table of Distribution was drafted and approved for the expanding need of personnel. Six hundred and twenty-five personnel, including instructors, tactical officers, and administrative types were added to Fort Lee to accommodate officer candidate training. The reason for the large personnel buildup was due to another revised input figure from CONARC on 12 March 1966. Actually, there were two figures involved: 1,400 and 2,000. CONARC directed the Quartermaster School to develop a plan for each figure. Subsequently, the 2,000 figure was decided on by higher headquarters and the Quartermaster School was given a green light to go ahead with its planning.

An administrative organization and an academic organization were set up to handle the expected flow of

candidates.

The first of these was the Officer Candidate School Regiment (later re-designated a Brigade) which was organized to provide administrative and command control over the candidates and to administer “school of the soldier” training such as inspections; drill, command, and ceremony; character guidance; Army Information Program; and physical training and combative. Initially, candidates were to be assigned to the Quartermaster School Troop Command. However, in view of the ever-increasing number of enlisted courses, an OCS Regiment was established. This organization was more in line with the philosophy of keeping candidates separated from the other activities on Post, therefore, it was readily adopted. The Regiment was organized with a headquarters and headquarters company and two battalions of four companies each. The battalions were responsible for exercising leadership control while the administrative workload was performed at the regimental level where a normal unit staff (S-1, S2/S-3, and S-4) was maintained.

The second of these organizations was the OCS Division. Its mission was the academic portion of OCS and its organization will be explained in Chapter III.

In line with the theory of separate treatment for candidates, the matter of training facilities became of major importance. The School decided to set aside the “11600” area of the Post for the training of its officer candidates. The headquarters and barracks facilities were located in permanent buildings (9303, 9304, and 9305) on another part of Fort Lee.

At this time, everything seemed to be in readiness for the incoming candidates: billets, equipment, training facilities, and instructors; and Brigade personnel were preparing themselves for the first 23-week single phase OCS Class since World War II. The policies for running OCS were formulated and ready to be tested. On 1 July 1966, the first 23-week class arrived at Fort Lee with 99 candidates ready to begin their arduous task which lay ahead.

A constant evaluation and re-evaluation of all policies, Programs of Instruction, and Standard Operating Procedures was accomplished to make improvement in the weaker areas. Some of these changes will be discussed in the ensuing chapters.

CHAPTER III

ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION

As a part of the planning and preparation that was going on in the spring of 1966, an academic organization was established to handle the more than one thousand hours of instruction a candidate would receive in OCS. It was decided to set up an OCS Division under the Supply Career Department of the School. This organization was an exact duplicate of the Supply Career Department with a Division Chief and three main branches. The three branches were: Combat-Combat Support; Command-Staff-Management; and Supply-Services-Support, with each branch having a head and several sections under it.

This duplicate organization was instrumented because the academic subjects taught by the Division were approximately the same as those the Supply Career Department taught in the Basic, Career, and other courses; but it was felt that because of the uniqueness of officer candidate training that separate personnel should be employed to instruct candidates. It was also felt that to add the large number of instructors needed directly to the Supply Career Department would make too large an organization and cause management problems. A Table of Distribution was approved authorizing some 140 instructors and instructor support personnel for the division.

A second POI, the first being for the 9-week, Phase II OCS, was set up for the 23-week single phase OCS, and sent to CONARC in May for approval. Approval was received in June from CONARC just in time to begin the first 23-week course on 1 July 1966. The POI consisted of 1012 total hours, and was broken down into three main areas. There were 659 academic hours of which the OCS Division taught about 540. The remainder, or 119 hours, was taught by other agencies of the School such as the Support Services, Airborne, Petroleum and Subsistence and Food Service Departments. The OCS Regiment was given 200 hours to teach, consisting of such subjects as drill and command, character guidance, physical training, inspections, and bivouac. These subjects were taught by Regiment personnel, mostly tactical officers. There were also 153 non-academic hours consisting of in-processing, counseling and evaluation, and Commanding Officer's Time. The first half of the course consisted of branch immaterial subjects while the last half was Quartermaster oriented. Intermingled throughout the 23 weeks were the Regiment taught subjects.

It was found that an important part of an effective POI was scheduling. This function was the responsibility of the S-3 of the OC Brigade which worked closely with the OCS Division on the program for each class. Many changes were instrumented over the months, and the weekly time table of the last few classes in Quartermaster (QM) OCS reflected the most effective program that the Brigade and the OCS Division were able to formulate. The result was that during the first week of the course, candidates received no academic training. Their first week's training consisted of organization and orientation to the officer candidate course, introduction to drill and command, introduction to Physical Training, counseling and evaluation, and Commander's Time. This type of training was beneficial in allowing the candidates time to organize and orient themselves to the course and get prepared for the long road ahead of them. In the second week of the course, the candidates began their academic training with a block of instruction on military leadership. This instruction conveyed the overall concept of military leadership to the candidates, and provided the impetus for their growth as leaders. The high point of this instruction was the Leaders Reaction Course which consisted of 12 tasks the candidates attempted to accomplish in small groups. Different leaders were appointed in each group for a particular task and they were responsible for the accomplishment of that task. A grade was given to the leaders based on how well they employed the leadership principles they learned in class.

During the next several weeks, the candidates were given training in map reading, CBR operations,

engineering operations, field and tactical communications, medical training, and many other subjects. About the seventh week, the candidates began their weapons and tactics training. The highlight of this training was a week at Camp A.P. Hill where the candidates were afforded an opportunity to demonstrate what they had learned in class.

About the twelfth or thirteenth week the candidates began their study of Quartermaster subjects. One of the subjects taught was Supply Operations in a Theater of Operations. This was a large block of instruction designed to teach the units and systems employed to provide combat service support in a theater of operations. A few of the other QM subjects were: Field Supply Procedures, Financial Management, Procurement, Field Services, Installation Services, Petroleum, and Unit Mess Operations.

During the term of Quartermaster OCS, the POI was constantly being modified and improved. A comparison between the original POI and the last POI reflected many changes; most of them minor. There were a few which reflected changes in thought on what the candidates should be taught. One recommendation was that the total number of hours taught in tactics, artillery operations, and weapons was reduced from 141 to 95. There were several reasons for this change, all of which stemmed from the fact that candidates who were being trained to become Quartermaster officers were taught the same tactics as Infantry officers. In line with the mission of "train Quartermaster officers" for Quartermaster-type assignments, it was decided that the candidates should learn mostly defensive tactics and road marches rather than Infantry oriented offensive tactics. Training such as the infiltration course, close combat course, hand grenade course, and train fire, were also eliminated from the POI because most candidates had just completed this training in Basic Training or Advanced Individual Training.

Another alteration in the POI increased the hours of instruction for field storage procedures because of the problems in this area being encountered by QM officers in Vietnam. More special warfare hours were incorporated because of the increasing importance of this type of warfare in today's Army.

The number of hours in drill and command was increased considerably. This change was necessitated in order to give the candidates more time and more material to instruct in Drill; thereby, giving tactical officers more opportunities to evaluate the candidates' abilities to instruct and speak convincingly before groups. Also, the number of hours of counseling and evaluation was increased in order to give the tactical officers more of an opportunity to accomplish this task during normal duty hours instead of at night.

The criteria for graduation were the achievement of a minimum 70% passing grade in each of two areas: academics and leadership. Each area was worth 50% of the final grade. Twenty-one tests were administered in academics to establish a grade for that aspect of the program. No maximum number of failures or a minimum number of passing grades was established. This situation led to many inconsistencies and problems. Most people felt that if a candidate failed "too many" tests, he should be relieved regardless of his academic average. Some individuals, however, did not agree with this viewpoint saying all that was required was a final average of 70%. The "too many" theorists could not agree on how many were "too many;" and, as a result, it took a considerable amount of time to adopt a more stringent academic policy. Another problem was that OCS graduates were being sent to the QM School after graduation for further specialized training, and many of these former candidates experienced difficulty with the academic courses at the school.

As a result of this dilemma, it became apparent that the OCS academic standards were too low, but there was still disagreement on how tight to tighten the standards. Finally, in the spring of 1967, the School published an academic policy which provided for academic dismissal of candidates who failed a certain number of tests. Emphasis was placed on Quartermaster subjects by providing that fewer failures would be allowed in this area than in the branch immaterial subjects. The policy was: "If a student fails any two of the following annexes:

- (1) Unit and Organization Supply
- (2) Supply Operations in a Theater of Operations
- (3) Unit Maintenance
- (4) Field Supply Procedures
- (5) Field Storage Procedures

or, if a student fails any four of the remaining thirteen annexes he will fail the course regardless of the percentage point total which he has accrued at that time.”

There were two main academic policies of QM OCS that were designed to aid the candidates in their academic progress. These policies were study halls and test reviews. From the very beginning, there was a two hour required study hall six nights a week for all basic and junior candidates. Senior candidates were not required to be present for study hall; but if they were in the barracks, they were required to maintain a mandatory two hours of quiet. Study hall hours were from 1900-2100 hours every night except Saturday; and candidates were to do nothing but study during these hours. Supervision of study hall was provided by the tactical officer.

The second of these academic policies was the test reviews which were given from the very beginning of the program. Usually one or two nights before each exam, the instructors would present a two hour mandatory test review at the candidates' home classroom. In the winter of 1966, however, it was decided to give the reviews during normal duty hours. Later, the OCS Division began to have doubts as to the value of test reviews and a survey was taken of each company to determine what was thought of the value of test reviews. As a result of this survey, it was decided that mandatory reviews would not be given for each test; but, if the candidates wished, they could request a review before any test if they felt it was necessary.

A big problem in any type of training program is a field training exercise, and the Officer Candidate Program was no exception. Just as constant changes were being made in other parts of the program, they were also made in field training. Originally, field training was conducted in two separate phases. The first phase of this training was Range Week which was conducted at Camp Pickett, Virginia, and consisted of Train-fire and other weapons familiarization. The second phase was Tactics Week held at Camp A. P. Hill, Virginia, and consisted of small unit tactics and escape and evasion.

After following this schedule for several classes, the School began to realize that most of the candidates attending OCS had been directly from Basic and Advanced Individual Training and had just completed Train-fire. Therefore, Train-fire was reduced to familiarization fire; and Range Week was moved from Camp Pickett to Camp A. P. Hill, and was being supported by a support platoon from HHC, OC Brigade. A TOE unit had been requested by the school for OCS support; and, in November 1966, this request was filled by assigning the 120th GS Company of Fort Lee to OCS. This eliminated the need for a support platoon from HHC.

In January 1967, the Brigade began to use Cooke Camp Site at Camp A. P. Hill. This camp site had semi-permanent buildings as opposed to the tents that were used at Wilcox Camp Site. In March 1967, the Brigade received a setback when it was announced that the 120th GS Company was being assigned to 22nd FASCOM (Field Army Support Command) and would no longer support Brigade training. The Brigade no longer maintained its own permanent support people, but had to request enlisted personnel from QMS and 22nd FASCOM on a temporary basis to support field training.

Then, in early summer of 1967, two changes in the training exercise took place. First, the QM School reached an agreement with the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, VA, for joint use of Anderson Camp Site. This camp site had new metal hutments and was located closer to the main post of A. P. Hill. The QM School and the Engineer School used the camp site on alternating weeks. The second change was the one which made the joint use of Anderson Camp Site possible. The Range Week and the Tactics Week were

combined so that each class went to the field only once.

As one can readily see, many changes were made in the POI during the existence of OCS at Fort Lee. A continuous effort was essential not only in formulating POI's and schedules, but in developing effective leadership training. Leadership training and its changes are discussed in the next chapter.



Built in 1958-59, Mifflin Hall (pictured above) was the center of activity during the sixties and early seventies with tens of thousands of student graduates passing through its doors because of the Vietnam War. Many of the OCS classes were held in this building along with their graduation ceremonies. "Old Mifflin" was demolished in 2010 and across the street a state-of-the-art modern new Sustainment Center of Excellence Headquarters Building was constructed and is scheduled to named Mifflin Hall to carry on its tradition.



Major General Victor J. MacLaughlin's last assignment before retirement was as the Commanding General, US Army Quartermaster Center and Fort Lee and Commandant of the Quartermaster School. He was also President of the Quartermaster Foundation for nearly a decade. The General passed away on March 20, 1989 at the age of 79.

ADDENDUM TO CHAPTER III

COURSE OF INSTRUCTION (as of 2 August 1967)

<u>SUB-COURSES</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
PART I - ACADEMIC SUBJECTS:	
Course Introduction and Orientation	3
Unit Maintenance	55
Combined Arms Subjects	57
Unit Staff and Administration	22
Engineer Operations	18
CBR and Nuclear Operations	20
Field and Tactical Communications	23
Military Leadership	32
Effective Writing	5
Map and Air Photograph Reading	37
Medical Training	7
Methods of Instruction	19
Military Justice	10
Special Warfare Operations	13
Weapons Training	41
Unit and Organization Supply	36
Field Supply Procedures	56
Financial Management	20
Automated Supply Systems	13
Field Storage Procedures	11
Procurement	11
Supply Operations in the Theater of Operations	58
Field Services	8
Installation Services	3
Petroleum	3
Unit Mess Operations	10
Guest Speakers	10
Sub-Total	601
OFFICER CANDIDATE REGIMENT	
Drill, Command and Ceremony	53
Character Guidance	5
Army Information Program	24
Physical Training and Combatives	48
Inspections	46
Bivouac	24
Sub-Total	200
Total Academic Subjects	801
PART II - NON-ACADEMIC SUBJECTS:	211
GRAND TOTAL	1,012

CHAPTER IV

LEADERSHIP TRAINING

Leadership training was the principle responsibility of the Officer Candidate Brigade, and the central figure of this training was the Officer Candidate Company. There were eight OC companies in the Brigade, each with a Company Commander, First Sergeant, Company Clerk, and from two to six tactical officers. The OC Company's mission was "to train (to include teaching), evaluate, and counsel officer candidates on leadership development". The mission of evaluating and counseling will be covered in a later chapter. In this chapter, our purpose will be to cover briefly all the training that was conducted by the Officer Candidate Brigade.

As a part of leadership training, the OC Brigade had the responsibility for teaching approximately 200 hours of the POI. These hours were discussed previously and included such subjects as drill and command, inspections, Physical Training, and the Army Information Program. The emphasis was not only on the candidates' knowledge in these areas, but also their ability to instruct these subjects. The candidates were required to stand before a group, speak clearly and convincingly, and to get their points across in accordance with the proper military instruction techniques. Tactical officers presented the first few hours of instruction as an example to the candidates on how the subject should be taught. Afterwards, the candidates were expected to teach the remainder of the hours; and each candidate was given several opportunities to instruct in each area. Emphasis was placed on allowing the weaker candidates to instruct more hours to instill the necessary self-confidence they needed to project themselves in front of a group.

These scheduled hours were only a part of leadership training. The candidates' day was 16 or more hours long, 7 days a week. Only 8 of these hours per day were in the POI and the rest were spent on such tasks as working on details, preparing for inspections, guard duty, writing evaluations, being counseled, studying, eating, social events, athletics and other such activities. All activities were closely supervised by the tactical officer who found indications of leadership ability or the lack of it in everything the candidates did.

The student chain of command was a large part of the leadership training in the Brigade. This chain of command was established in each company and was changed twice a week to give candidates several opportunities to exercise leadership and demonstrate their degrees of proficiency in leadership. The chain of command consisted of a Company Commander, Executive Officer, First Sergeant, Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant, Squad Leader, and Assistant Squad Leader. Performance in a chain of command position determined a large part of the candidates' leadership grade.



Originally, each company was divided into three platoons with four squads per platoon. In the winter of 1967, LTC Paul Kilpatrick, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, devised a plan to divide each company into six platoons instead of three. The purpose of this plan was to provide more "officer positions" in the chain of command (i.e., platoon leader). Emphasis was placed on the company level positions and platoon leaders. As a part of the six platoon system, LTC Kilpatrick also devised a system of oral counseling conducted by fellow candidates as well as tactical officers. This system was adopted by the 2nd Battalion. In the early days of OCS at Fort Lee, tactical officers relied extensively on physical harassment to apply pressure. Everything the officer candidates did was under the threat of physical harassment thus making

their tasks more difficult. The use of physical harassment as a pressure device was adopted from other officer candidate schools visited by tactical officers and company commanders. Although this type of activity was contrary to Army Regulations, it was apparently an accepted practice and there had been no attempts to eliminate the unauthorized and inappropriate activities that had been associated with OCS for many years. Accordingly, in the early days of OCS at Fort Lee, candidates were dropped for push-ups or given pull-ups at the discretion of any officer who felt it necessary. This treatment was most often used as an on-the-spot punishment or corrective action for improper acts of candidates. There were also a considerable number of after-duty activities such as grass drills, double-timing, wind sprints, company attack problems, patrolling problems, rope bridge building, and night marches.

It soon became evident to the Brigade Commander, Colonel Walter H. Cooper, that this method of applying pressure was not constructive nor conducive to learning and was therefore not desirable in the Officer Candidate Program. Consequently, in August of 1966, Colonel Cooper ordered the elimination of all physical harassment from the Quartermaster Officer Candidate School. In its place he substituted a program of psychological pressure, applied by such means as increasing the standards of personal appearance and making more rigid the rules of personal conduct. This system compelled the candidate to organize, set priorities, and make the most efficient use of their time. This type of pressure realistically tested such leadership qualities as initiative, ingenuity, dependability, adaptability, motivation, and enthusiasm.

As a result of the revisions made by Col Cooper, the new philosophy of training at Quartermaster OCS can best be summarized by the following paragraph.

The Quartermaster Officer Candidate Program is a training program, and not a screening process. All personnel involved with officer candidate training will approach their jobs positively and understand that they have a responsibility to teach leadership; not merely to identify the lack of it. The approach will be one of developing candidates into leaders. Officer candidates are inexperienced, but they have the potential to develop into company grade officers. The principle duties of a tactical officer are to teach, observe, evaluate, and assist candidates and to recommend commissioning of those who progress satisfactorily. In order to accomplish these objectives, the tactical officer must be fully cognizant of each candidate's abilities and frailties. He must know and understand the criteria by which he evaluates others, and meet those criteria himself.



The knowledge he possesses of each candidate must be of such profundity that he can build a candidate's basic character and mold him into his future role as a custodian of our nation's defense. He will spend many after-duty hours observing, counseling, and assisting the candidates assigned to his platoon; and the only reward for a job well-done will be the self-satisfaction generated by knowing that he developed each commissioned candidate of his platoon from a novice soldier to a well-disciplined military leader.

In the fall of 1966, CONARC decided to standardize training among the various officer candidate schools. A CONARC inspection team visited each of the officer candidate schools and inspected their training and operations. As a result of these visits CONARC Regulation 350-11 was published in January of 1967 giving specific guidance to all officer candidate schools concerning the treatment and training of candidates. Incorporated within this regulation were many of the policies that Col Cooper had established earlier.

One of the main provisions of this regulation was that candidates will be taught what was expected of them before being graded on their performance. Therefore, the first four weeks of OCS became, in a manner of speaking, "free" because after the initial 28 days of training, a candidate's records were discarded and he was allowed to begin anew with no marks against him.

Although the unauthorized and inappropriate extra training that had been going on was eliminated, there were still many constructive activities to keep the candidates busy. The candidates' day began at 0530 with first call. At 0615 hours they had their first formation - Reveille. From 0615 until 0730 hours, they ate and prepared for inspection. At 0730 hours they had an inspection conducted by the company cadre and then double-timed to class. Classes were conducted from 0800 until 1700 hours with one hour off for lunch. From 1700 until 1900 hours, they ate their evening meal, performed personal business such as writing letters, shining shoes, going to the laundry, getting haircuts and if they had time, visiting the Gold Bar Club. From 1900 to 2100 hours, they had study hall and from 2100 to 2200 hours they worked on detail areas such as hallways, latrines, and offices. At 2200 hours, the lights were out.

Weekends were spent on area beautification projects both inside and outside the buildings, and extra efforts on detail areas and personal gear. On weekends they also worked off demerits that they accumulated during the week.

As a result of their time, effort, and initiative, the candidates soon gained a reputation as the sharpest soldiers on post - a reputation they well deserved. The candidates were many times called upon to participate in reviews and act as honor guards for distinguished visitors to Fort Lee. Among the dignitaries honored by OC Brigade reviews were: General Paul L. Freeman, retiring Commanding General of CONARC; LTG William F. Train, retiring Commanding General of First Army; and LTG Johnathon O. Seaman, Commanding General of First Army. As part of their training, the candidates organized and conducted the reviews in their entirety under the guidance of the company cadre.

In order to show the candidates' progress through the course, the program was divided into three distinct phases. From the first week through the eleventh week the candidates were in the Basic Phase. Their uniform consisted of "OCS" brass on each collar, QM Center patch on the left sleeve, and a black helmet liner with an OCS decal in front, QM Center decal on the right side, and QM School decal on the left side. At the end of the eleven weeks, the candidates were declared Junior. This status signified that they had successfully completed one-half of the Officer Candidate Program and they celebrated this achievement with a party at the Gold Bar Club or at the Fort Lee Officers Open Mess. Also, they added some distinctive items to the uniform to signify their status as Junior candidates. These items included a green stripe running horizontally around the black helmet liner, green tabs under the OCS brass, and the QM School crest on each epaulet. The real milestone of the course, however, was the achievement of Senior status. This distinction was reached at the end of the eighteenth week and meant that the candidates had nearly realized the goal of becoming a Second Lieutenant in the Army of the United States. This occasion was celebrated with a review, in which the company achieving Senior status was honored, and a social function held at the Fort Lee Officers Open Mess. Senior candidates exchanged their black helmet liners for buff-colored helmet liners, and changed the green tabs worn under the OCS brass to buff. Senior status meant more privileges, but it also meant more responsibilities. During this phase the candidates were expected to begin their transition from enlisted to officer status. These candidates were assigned to basic and junior companies in the brigade to assist the cadre in inspecting, supervising, and instructing the subordinate candidates.

As previously mentioned, candidates were kept quite busy during their 23 weeks in OCS. In addition to the everyday routine of classes, inspections, PT, studies, and chain of command duties, there were several other activities that the candidates had to perform several times during their training. One example of these additional requirements of Officer Candidate training was guard duty. In the fall of 1966, the OC Brigade received a requirement from Post Headquarters to furnish an interior guard for the Brigade's area of the post. Four guard posts were established and each guard walked a two-hour tour beginning at 1800 hours each

evening. Each guard walked only one tour. There were six reliefs, with a commander for each relief. The reliefs consisted of basic or junior candidates and the commander of the guard and Sergeant of the Guard were senior candidates. Guard detail was rotated among companies each week according to a duty roster maintained by the Assistant Adjutant who was also responsible for briefing the guard each evening and receiving their report each morning. In the summer of 1967, one change was made - the four guard posts were reduced to two, but the same area was still covered.

Another part of this additional training was the Courtesy Patrol. Each weekend and holiday a senior candidate was detailed to make a roving patrol of certain areas of the post to observe the conduct and appearance of officer candidates anywhere on the military reservation. This patrol was initiated to insure that the high standards of this Brigade were maintained at all times and that no candidate or group of candidates embarrassed the Brigade by improper appearance or conduct. The Courtesy Patrol proved highly successful in maintaining the very high standards of this Brigade.

Still another phase of additional training was the many extra duties assigned to candidates. As any military man knows, a Second Lieutenant is eligible for a seemingly endless number of extra duties in addition to his primary job. These duties may range from Mess Officer to Police and Sanitation Officer and from Insurance Officer to Fund Drive Officer. In order to acquaint them with as many of these additional duties as possible, the candidates were assigned jobs to perform and assisted the cadre officers who were assigned these extra duties in the companies. The extra duties were rotated frequently to give as many candidates as possible a chance to become familiar with typical extra duties assigned a second lieutenant.



There were also several organizations which played a large part in the life of the candidates. The first of these was the Student Council. This organization consisted of six candidates, two from each platoon, popularly elected by the candidates. From this group of six, a president, a vice-president, and a secretary-treasurer, were elected. The Student Council was responsible for coordinating problems affecting the company as a whole, planning and arranging social activities, and making recommendations to the company commander for improvements which would affect the efficiency and appearance of the unit.

Another of the organizations was the Honor Council. The Brigade had an honor code which briefly stated that candidates did not lie, cheat, or steal, and did not tolerate those who did. To enforce the Honor Code and to investigate alleged Honor Code violations was the job of the Honor Council. Originally, an Honor Council was established in each company by popular vote of the candidates, but CONARC Regulation 350-11 directed that an Honor Council be set up on a battalion level. In January of 1967, a Battalion Honor Council SOP was written which directed the Student Council President from each company to serve as the Honor Council Representative, and that the senior man among these representatives would serve as president of the council.

The Gold Bar Club was the third of the aforementioned organizations. It was operated by the NCO Open Mess and served as a dayroom, lounge, and recreation area for the candidates of the Brigade. The Gold Bar Club was a place where the candidates could go to read, listen to music, watch TV, or just relax. It provided a locale where the candidates could meet with and entertain their wives or friends. Officers of the

Brigade were not permitted in the Gold Bar Club (GBC) because it was exclusively for the candidates. The first GBC was established by the first company in OCS at Fort Lee, Class 66-16, which arrived from Fort Knox on 15 May 1966. It was in the "11000" area of the post in close proximity to their barracks. When this company moved to the OC Brigade's permanent building located on B Avenue in July of 1966, the GBC was closed, and later moved to the New Brigade area.

A building was not readily available in the Brigade area for a Gold Bar Club; therefore, a temporary dayroom was opened in Building 9304 for the candidates. After some delay, a building across from Brigade Headquarters was obtained for the Gold Bar Club, but could not be used until a major renovation was completed. Appropriations were obtained to completely remodel the interior and exterior of the building. The new Gold Bar Club was finally opened in February of 1967 and operated until the close of OCS.

This club was the hub of social life in the Brigade, but it was by no means all of the social activity. The junior and senior parties, previously mentioned, were the major organized social functions in OCS. These parties served not only as relaxation and recreation to break the monotony of training, but also as a valuable vehicle in the teaching of military social customs and courtesies. The Junior Party was a semi-formal affair which only the candidates, their wives, and dates, and the company cadre attended. The candidates did all the planning for the party including place, time, food, entertainment, decorations, and social protocol. The Senior Party, on the other hand, was a much more formal event to which the officers wore dress blues and wives and dates wore cocktail dresses. The guest of honor was usually the Assistant Commandant of the QM School. This party consisted of a receiving line, cocktail hour, dinner, candidate entertainment, and a dance. Again, the candidates did all the planning and preparation for this function.

Wives, as well as the candidates had to be trained in army protocol. For this reason, the Officer Candidate Wives Club was organized. This club was under the overall supervision of Mrs. Walter H. Cooper, the wife of the Brigade Commander. A Club was organized by each company commander's wife, or if he was unmarried, a designated representative. The purpose of the club was to teach the officer candidates' wives military social customs and courtesies in preparation for their new role as officer's wives. Each club held several coffees and luncheons throughout the 23 weeks of OCS.

As everyone can readily ascertain from this description of training, the Officer Candidates enrolled in OCS at Fort Lee were trained in various areas in order to develop them as whole men. Training ranged from field maneuvers to social protocol in order to evolve these individuals from novice soldiers into technically proficient military beings with basic knowledge in the social graces. After graduation, they could stand upright with their contemporaries as commissioned officers and gentlemen. The foundation for growth was more than adequately cast in OCS, and these former candidates were prepared to build on these rudiments to the point of excellence in their fields of endeavor.

CHAPTER V

EVAULATION

At the beginning of OCS at Fort Lee, guidance from COARC was rather limited in the area of how to evaluate the leadership progress of candidates. Academic evaluation presented no problem - a formal test for each annex of instruction. Leadership evaluation, on the other hand, was an area of intense concern. Just how could you validly evaluate candidates' leadership development throughout the program, and what criteria could be established to effectively expand and perfect their abilities in order that they would be able to perform duties commensurate with Quartermaster second lieutenants? These questions had to be answered before the arrival of the first 23-week single phase class. Personnel assigned to the Officer Candidate Brigade as tactical officers and company commanders were dispatched to the various other OCS's to observe the leadership development and evaluation procedures used to train candidates.

Many techniques for rating, counseling, and developing candidates were learned from these visits and the personnel returned from their sojourns with a wealth of knowledge. With the use of written material secured from other OCS's, representatives of the S-2/S-3 of the OC Brigade began hammering out a Tactical Officers Guide and an Officer Candidate Program Manual. The Evaluation Section, comprised of an officer and four enlisted men, gathered information concerning leadership development and established procedures for the use of forms, maintenance of candidates' files, rating of leadership, operation of boards, and relief of candidates.

Early in June 1966, formal classes, taught by the officers presently assigned to the 9-week Phase II OCS, were scheduled to orient newly assigned tactical officers on the procedures and forms used to evaluate candidates. Later, the Evaluation Section absorbed these duties.



Initially, the criteria for evaluating candidates were based on comparing their performance with 14 specified leadership traits. These traits were outlined on the evaluation form used to record a candidate's performance in a chain of command position. The test used to identify these traits, or the lack of them, was the application of pressure through physical harassment as a substitute for the pressures of combat. This procedure was adopted at Fort Lee from other Officer Candidate Schools.

As early as August 1966, Colonel Cooper changed the philosophy of evaluation to one of developing leadership, not merely identifying the lack of it. In conjunction with this modernized philosophy, he eliminated physical harassment and personal degradation of candidates.

In January 1967, CONARC published Regulation 350-11 which was designed to improve and standardize officer candidate training. This regulation had incorporated within it many of the changes already made in the Quartermaster OCS. Also, this regulation established the use of functional objectives as the criterion for evaluating candidates. Examples of these functional objectives were:

- a. Ability to stand before a company of men, issue commands in clear, concise terms and have the commands understood and obeyed.
- b. Ability to take charge of a group of men, organizes them into a cohesive functioning group, instruct the men as to their mission, and supervise execution thereof.
- c. Ability to take charge of a group of men, assigns each a task, instruct the men as to their tasks, and supervise execution thereof.

The tactical officer had to use at least these three objectives when he evaluated a candidate's performance in a leadership position. The resultant product, as proven by the statistics presented in a later chapter, was a more mature, intelligent, and disciplined individual.

The Counseling and Evaluation Report was the crux of the Evaluation System. The tactical officer used this form to record all observations, both favorable and unfavorable, and counseled the candidates accordingly. These sessions set the foundation for the individual's growth in the Officer Candidate Course. Mandatory counseling sessions were held at the end of each chain of command and during the 5th, 10th, 17th, and 21st weeks of the Program. The fifth week counseling period was held to inform the candidates of their progress during the first four weeks, or orientation period, of the Program. The 10th, 17th, and 21st week periods were held to tell the candidates of how well they fared on the peer ratings (these ratings are explained later). In each of these compulsory sessions, candidates were counseled individually on their performance to date. During the infancy of OCS at Fort Lee, it was felt by a number of individuals that each candidate should be counseled a minimum of once a week. This situation required a tactical officer to counsel from 25 to 40 men per week, depending on the size of his particular platoon, and he was not permitted to interview officer candidates during study hall (1900-2100 hrs.). As might be expected, the tactical officer was given too much with too little time to accomplish his tasks. Modification of this requirement was necessary and, as a result, the tactical officer's mandatory counseling was reduced to the 5th, 10th, 17th, and 21st week sessions.

In addition to evaluating a candidate's performance in each chain of command position, a peer rating was completed at specified intervals during the course. This peer rating was designed to afford the candidates an opportunity to evaluate the members of their respective platoons by using a separate peer rating form for each evaluation. Initially, these ratings were conducted in the 6th, 14th, and 20th weeks and later changed to the 8th, 15th, and 20th weeks. The last change for completing this task (the 9th, 16th, and 20th weeks) was outlined in CONARC Reg. 350-11 and adopted in the Officer Candidate Brigade on 30 January 1967.




The tactical officer would also complete a peer rating form on each candidate assigned to his platoon. By the use of the numerous evaluations on each candidate, the tactical officer could then determine how each individual was progressing, and whether there were any areas of leadership in which he needed development. This rating proved to be quite useful in determining which candidates were honestly performing to the best of their abilities and which ones were merely enjoying the ride.

With the combination of all the evaluations forms, the tactical officer could then ascertain the candidates who were qualified to continue in the Program, the candidates who displayed potential but needed development, and the candidates who should be relieved from their present class. The latter type of candidate was the next area of concern. How could we then eliminate a candidate proven unworthy of attaining a commission?

If it was necessary to recycle or relieve a candidate, his case was forwarded to the Brigade Commander for final action. If the cases were for relief because of academic or leadership deficiencies, however, the Brigade Commander convened a Faculty Board - consisting of a president (field grade officer), two members (commissioned officers), and a recorder - for further investigation. This procedure was directed by CONARC Reg. 350-11. After the Faculty Board interviewed the candidate, the case, with the Board's recommendation, was forwarded to the Brigade Commander for final action. In all other cases, the Brigade Commander had the final authority. This procedure for relief sounds simple enough, but it must be remembered that this process was the end result of much effort to find a more effective and less time-consuming ritual to follow.

From the summer of 1966 to January 1967, the peer rating form was not in existence. The animal used was called the Order of Merit Work Sheet or more familiarly known to the candidates as the “bayonet” sheet. In this leadership rating, each candidate completed an order of merit worksheet, and ranked each of his respective platoon members in a numerical position. Each line had a point value which was tabulated and converted to a percentage score by the Student Services Section of the QM School.

An interesting facet of this system was that the candidate and tactical officer had to rate one-quarter of the platoon in the lower quarter and a corresponding number in the top quarter. The Company Commander had to rate one quarter of the company in both the top and bottom quarters. Invariably, the candidates rated at the lower end of the scale failed leadership for that period and their status in the program was jeopardized. These candidates had to appear before a Faculty Board in order to determine the status of their cases.



Guidance from higher headquarters stipulated that the proceedings of this Faculty Board should not be the same as a Military Tribunal. This device was not instrumented to determine guilt or innocence, but merely to ascertain whether a candidate should be retained in his present class, recycled from this class, or relieved from the Officer Candidate Program. Further guidance directed that each candidate considered for relief for any reason must appear before this Faculty Board. This evaluation tool turned out to be too time-consuming for the officers involved and the atmosphere leaned heavily toward that of a tribunal. The candidate was called before the Board, sworn in and asked several questions. Then, the tactical officer was summoned and the process repeated. On some days there were many as nine cases heard, and this situation entailed the consummation of over a full workday, or approximately 54 man-hours to hear these cases.

Cessation of hearings by a Board occurred in the fall of 1966, but it was again started when CONARC published Regulation 350-11. The number of cases heard, however, decreased considerably because only candidates deficient in leadership or academics were summoned. Membership of the Board decreased from five to three, and a completely informal atmosphere prevailed during the proceedings.

The Order of Merit Work Sheet was replaced by the peer rating form with the emanation of the CONARC regulation. Before this regulation was published, however, the forced rating system (compelling individuals to rate officer candidates in upper and lower quarter) was expelled because of its apparent illegitimacy. This system proved repugnant because it compelled tactical officers to place candidates in the lower quarter although they might not consider anyone unsatisfactory. Blatant examples of this situation occurred repeatedly in the 20th week ratings.

It must be realized at this time that there were other reasons for relief besides Leadership and Academics. Paragraph 54b of AR 350-50 outlined the various reasons why candidates could be relieved from the Program. They were disciplinary reasons, disqualifying physical reasons, compassionate or hardship reasons, security reasons, lack of motivation, falsification or omission of facts on application, lack of adaptability, honor code violations, misconduct, and personal reasons of the individual candidate (provided the candidate had completed the first seven weeks of the course). Most of the aforementioned reasons were self-explanatory; however, there was one area which needed more elucidation.

As might be anticipated, some individuals realized their own shortcomings or did not truly desire a commission and wanted to quit. The problems created by this type of candidate were: processing of the case and authority for relief. Original schools of thought centered around relieving the individual for lack of

motivation or adaptability during the first seven weeks, and relieving him for personal reasons thereafter.

More pronounced guidance was received from higher headquarters, however, which curtailed the practice of allowing candidates to quit during the first seven weeks. As a result, the individual not motivated to become an officer was required to remain in the program for seven weeks and this situation engendered many unattractive problems. The uninspired corrupted the more enthusiastic and, consequently, more candidates lost the desire to excel in the program. Some candidates, who might have developed into outstanding commissioned officers with the proper guidance, experienced difficulty completing the course.

In addition to disqualification of an individual for apparent non-development, it is customary in the educational system to recognize outstanding achievements of those who graduate. OCS was certainly no exception. Candidates who were ranked in the top ten percent of their respective class were considered for designation as distinguished graduates, and the individual who proved himself exceptional in the areas of leadership and academic development was designated the honor graduate. Determination of the individuals who received this distinction was a comparatively simple task. The company commander initiated a recommended order of merit to numerically rank the candidates of the entire class from one to one-hundred. Student Services' personnel combined the academic point accumulation and the leadership point accumulation to obtain a final percentage grade for the course. Then, they sent a listing of the top ten percent of candidates, in their respective order, to the Brigade Evaluation Section. The next step was the convening of another Faculty Board. With the use of the list of the top ten, the Board interviewed the respective candidates individually to determine if they were qualified for this distinction. The opportunity to submit an application for a Regular Army commission was afforded each of the distinguished graduates and, in addition, the honor graduate received an engraved pen and pencil set. Diplomas for these individuals were annotated in gold.

In retrospect, one can readily ascertain the importance of evaluation in leadership development. After all, how can any novice readily overcome dilemmas unless he is guided? Teaching a person the correct procedures, however, is not the educational system in its entirety. An individual must be tested to see what he has retained and the evaluation system, explained in this chapter, was the method used to test the retentive power and potential abilities of officer candidates at Fort Lee.



CHAPTER VI

THE CANDIDATE

One can readily see from the previous chapters that from time to time many changes in the Officer Candidate Program were necessary. Some of these alterations were caused by schedule conflicts and a need for continuity in training. On the other hand, the type of candidate arriving at Fort Lee prompted still other changes in concepts and techniques of training and this section described this individual.

The candidates arriving at Fort Lee for the 9-week, Phase II, OCS were primarily prior service individuals endeavoring to further their careers by attaining a commission. Generally speaking, they were basically intelligent but their level of achievement was limited. Numerous academic difficulties were experienced by these initial candidates, and constant reviews of annexes had to be conducted to literally drive the subject matter “down their throats.” Even then, the second class to arrive from Fort Knox had 28 recycles for academics. Leadership training, however, was rather superficial in nature because of the individual candidates’ military experience factors. More effort was devoted to expanding traits already present than to begin with fundamentals.

The aforementioned situation changed, however, when the flow of college graduates began to arrive at Fort Lee. The average years of education per class rose progressively from its lowest point of 13 years up to 16.2 years, and the average prior service declined from 40 months to 4 months. Changes in the program were essential because now the candidates had a higher level of education which expunged the need for constant academic review, and they had a lower level of military experience which created a need for fundamental leadership training.

The influx of college graduates, however, did not quell the training problems. Certainly, the candidates were well-educated, but some lacked the motivation to complete an arduous OCS Program. Others merely wanted to consume as much time as possible in Army training programs to deplete their active service requirements, and then drop out of OCS with the hope that they would not receive overseas orders. Still others merely desired the prestige, pay, and better living and working conditions that evolved from being commissioned; and they were not willing to inject any self-effort into completion of the program. Another type of despondent candidate was the one who, although he had completed his baccalaureate at one of the “finer” institutions of higher learning, was not able to achieve a passing average in academics. Personnel at Fort Lee began to disbelieve the screening process’s validity, and one could only speculate as to what was happening. Querying the candidates revealed that recruiting stations were merely taking volunteers without further introspection into their mental, medical, or physical requirements. The Selection Board, as one candidate flatly stated, “consisted of only a first lieutenant, and they only talked about sports.” This is hardly a befitting process for determining future leaders in today’s Army, and one can imagine the type of candidate that was enrolling for OCS in the spring of 1967. In fact, one class had an attrition rate of 42% because 51 novices decided to quit.

Fortunately, more motivated individuals than the ones previously described continued to volunteer for OCS; and, invariably, they were the individuals for whom the cadre looked. Although they too had their problems in adaptability and performance, they were men most likely to develop and graduate.

The statistics presented below show some reflection of the type of candidate beginning OCS, graduating from OCS, and being relieved from OCS at Fort Lee.

	Beginning	Ending	Relieved
--	------------------	---------------	-----------------

Average Age	22.6 yrs	23.0 yrs	21.2 yrs
Average Service	12.8 mos	13.5 mos	10.3 mos
Average Education	15.0 yrs	14.9 yrs	15.3 yrs
Average OCT	127.9	129.6	122.2
Average GT	128.4	129.0	126.4
Marital Status			
Married	38%	43%	22%
Single	62%	57%	78%

Statistics, in themselves, can be misleading. These figures present a basic picture of the characteristics of the relieved candidates. Accordingly, they appear to be young, with relatively little prior service; educated, but basically not as comprehending as the graduated candidates and single. One could not assuredly say that a person possessing all the attributes of a relieved candidate would not graduate, nor can one say the reverse. The same assertion is true of the statistics presented for the graduated candidate. The reason for this situation is that these tabular results do not include personal qualities and incentives. One cannot pictorially or statistically represent what a person feels within himself. Generally, the candidates who graduated from OCS seemed to be older, more mature, and more intelligent individuals. This type of candidate also had the least difficulty completing OCS.

In conclusion, special recognition must be given to Colonel Walter H. Cooper, Lieutenant Colonel Paul E. Kilpatrick, and Lieutenant Colonel Philip H. Myers, for their foresight and guidance in making the OCS Program a success at Fort Lee. Personnel of the Brigade can look with pride on the many candidates who passed through this training process to enter their own history in the annals of time.



APPENDIX I

The Class Statistics is a chart showing a consolidation of the class sheets in the original "History" with several additional columns of information added. It does not appear in the original "History."

Class Statistics									
Class Number	Company Designation	Date Begun	Date Turned Junior	Date Turned Senior	Date of Graduation	Number Started	Number Graduated	Percent Graduated	Vietnam War Deaths
66-16*	A	16 May 66	at Ft Knox	18 Jun 66	19 Jul 66	93	90	0.968	2
66-21**	A	21 Jul 66	at Ft Knox	26 Aug 66	23 Sep 66	72	44	0.611	1
66-26***	A	16 Sep 66	at Ft Knox	22 Oct 66	18 Nov 66	104	105	1.010	1
67-1	B	1 Jul 66	7 Sep 66	5 Nov 66	14 Dec 66	99	74	0.747	0
67-2	C	22 Jul 66	8 Oct 66	26 Nov 66	19 Jan 67	91	69	0.758	0
67-3	D	12 Aug 66	28 Oct 66	16 Dec 66	9 Feb 67	123	95	0.772	0
67-4	E	2 Sep 66	18 Nov 66	21 Jan 67	3 Mar 67	120	89	0.742	0
67-5	F	23 Sep 66	10 Dec 66	11 Feb 67	23 Mar 67	125	84	0.672	0
67-6	G	17 Oct 66	14 Jan 67	4 Mar 67	13 Apr 67	119	106	0.891	0
67-7	H	7 Nov 66	4 Feb 67	25 Mar 67	4 May 67	123	80	0.650	0
67-8	A	28 Nov 66	10 Feb 67	15 Apr 67	23 May 67	117	96	0.821	0
67-9	B	12 Dec 66	11 Mar 67	29 Apr 67	7 Jun 67	122	97	0.795	0
67-10	C	9 Jan 67	25 Mar 67	13 May 67	20 Jun 67	135	97	0.719	0
67-11	D	27 Jan 67	14 Apr 67	8 Jun 67	12 Jul 67	120	80	0.667	0
67-12	E	20 Feb 67	7 May 67	13 Jun 67	3 Aug 67	133	78	0.586	0
67-13	F	10 Mar 67	26 May 67	14 Jul 67	22 Aug 67	131	77	0.588	0
67-14	G	3 Apr 67	16 Jun 67	4 Aug 67	13 Sep 67	155	91	0.587	0
67-15	H	24 Apr 67	8 Jul 67	26 Aug 67	4 Oct 67	122	83	0.680	0
67-16	A	15 May 67	29 Jul 67	15 Sep 67	25 Oct 67	116	90	0.776	0
67-17	B	12 Jun 67	26 Aug 67	14 Oct 67	22 Nov 67	118	65	0.551	1
68-1	C	3 Jul 67	15 Sep 67	4 Nov 67	14 Dec 67	95	74	0.779	0
68-2	<i>Cancelled</i>								
68-3	D	28 Aug 67	11 Nov 67	13 Jan 68	21 Feb 68	82	52	0.634	0
Totals						2515	1816	0.722	5
<p>* 66-16 started at Ft Knox on 10 Feb 66 and finished on 12 May 66, then transferred to Ft Lee **66-21 started at Ft Knox on 21 Apr 66 and finished on 21 Jul 66, then transferred to Ft Lee ***66-26 started at Ft Knox on 10 Jun 66 and finished on 8 Sep 66, then transferred to Ft Lee</p>									